The Firm prevailed on a motion for reconsideration on behalf of its client, a life insurance company, in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division (Hudson County), resulting in its client obtaining a full dismissal of claims asserted against it by two plaintiffs. Those two plaintiffs had brought claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract in connection with the client’s handling of several life insurance policies. After the Chancery Court denied the Firm’s motion to dismiss, the Firm argued that the court should reconsider its ruling. First, the Firm argued that plaintiffs’ tort claims failed because they merely alleged that the Firm’s client improperly performed its contractual obligations under the policies. The fiduciary duty claim, the Firm argued, was doubly deficient because plaintiffs had not alleged—nor did there exist—the requisite “special relationship” between the plaintiffs and the insurance company. Finally, the Firm argued that plaintiffs’ contract claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, which could not be tolled on account of the discovery rule. As the Firm pointed out, plaintiffs were suing on behalf of a party to the at-issue contracts (i.e., the policies), and under New Jersey law, contracting parties are not afforded the benefit of the discovery rule on breach of contract claims because they are presumed to know when a breach occurs. On reconsideration, the Chancery Court adopted the Firm’s arguments in their entirety, granted the Firm’s reconsideration motion, and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims.
Fishkin Lucks prevailed on appeal before the New York Appellate Division, First Department, on behalf of its client, a life insurance company. The appellate victory affirmed a trial court order denying a motion to dismiss the Firm’s clients claims against two New York attorneys for violation of section 487 of New York’s Judiciary Law (concerning deceit in the practice of law), based on allegations that the defendant attorneys had paid a bribe to secure false testimony from a critical fact witness in a previous litigation. The defendant attorneys argued to the trial court that a release within the agreement settling the underlying action barred the claim. The Firm successfully opposed that argument, persuading the trial court that the release did not expressly cover unknown and future claims and that only covered claims relating to the substance of underlying action, and not the way that action was litigated. Following oral argument, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision in full.
The Firm obtained a complete dismissal on behalf of its client, a multinational energy corporation, in two quiet title actions brought in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County. The plaintiffs in those actions argued that the Firm’s client potentially had an interest in certain properties and pipelines in which plaintiffs were seeking to quiet title. Plaintiffs sought a judgment not only declaring their right to quiet and peaceful possession of the properties and pipelines, without encumbrance, but that their claims did not preclude them from later bringing unspecified environmental claims relating to the properties and pipelines. In granting the Firm’s motions to dismiss the actions, the Court adopted in full the Firm’s arguments. First, it held that the quiet title actions were moot even where the Firm’s client had previously equivocated on whether it had an interest in the subject properties and pipelines because the client ultimately disclaimed any such interest. Second, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to obtain a judgment recognizing the viability of hypothetical future environmental claims because they amounted to impermissible requests for advisory opinions.
Fishkin Lucks obtained summary judgment on behalf of its client, an investor, in a lawsuit to recover its significant investment with a real estate crowdfunding firm in connection with the development of The Standard Hotel in Chicago. The Firm’s client had agreed to make its investment on the condition that, under certain circumstances, the crowdfunding firm would redeem that investment with an 18 percent pre-tax annual compounded return. Although the Firm’s client made a proper redemption request, the crowdfunding firm refused to honor that request, purportedly on the basis of language in the documents governing the investment permitting it to “suspended dealings.” The Firm moved for summary judgment, arguing that by the plain terms of the investment documents a suspension of dealings required that all—not just some—dealings be suspended, and it was undisputed that the crowdfunding firm was still engaging in some dealings when it declined the redemption request. The Court agreed with the Firm’s argument and determined that it was entitled to recoup its full investment plus the promised interest. The Court likewise rejected the crowdfunding firm’s competing motion for summary judgment, through which it argued that it could selectively suspend dealings.
The Firm obtained today a $64.2 million judgment on behalf of its client, an international real estate developer, in the New York County Supreme Court. Our client brought suit in November 2019 against a Swiss-based financier arising out of its breach of a cooperation agreement concerning the financing and development of a large real estate project in Warsaw, Poland. While our client complied with its obligations under the cooperation agreement, the Swiss-based lender prevented out client from exercising its right to reacquire collateral shares in companies involved in the Poland development, in violation of the cooperation agreement. After attempts to resolve the breaches were unsuccessful, we brought suit for conversion and breach of contract. The Court awarded the client its full damages, statutory interest, and costs of suit.
The Firm prevailed in a AAA arbitration brought by a consumer against the Firm’s client, an international solar company, in which the claimant alleged that he was entitled to rescission of the parties' 25-year contract, arguing that contract failed to comply with disclosures mandated by the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and its implementing regulations, and that it was an unenforceable electronically signed agreement pursuant to the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 7001 et seq. Following an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Firm's client, finding that the contract was enforceable and complied with all of the TILA disclosure requirements.
