The Firm prevailed on a motion for summary judgment today in the Court of Common Pleas in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, securing a full dismissal of all claims against its client, a manufacturer of waterproofing products. Plaintiff had asserted causes of action against the Firm’s client sounding in strict products liability and negligence on the basis that the manufacturer’s waterproofing product had purportedly failed, causing water intrusion at a building. In fact, plaintiff’s own expert had opined that the product was not defective and did not cause the intrusion, but in any event, the Court, after hearing oral argument, dismissed all claims as to the Firm’s client on the basis that the applicable two and four year statutes of limitations had expired prior to plaintiff’s bringing suit in 2013. Specifically, the Court held that the claims accrued in 2008, when plaintiff admitted to observing water intrusion. The Court credited the Firm’s arguments for why, as a matter of law, plaintiff could not invoke the discovery rule or repair doctrine to toll the statutes of limitations.
The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas today, in the wake of motions filed by the Firm, dismissed in full complaints filed against the Firm’s clients, Ashland Inc. and Univar USA Inc., on the basis that Pennsylvania had no personal jurisdiction over them. The Court agreed with the Firm’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit Pennsylvania state courts to assert general personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations, even where those corporations are registered to do business in Pennsylvania. This is the first ruling of its kind in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
A Pennsylvania statute provides that, in order to do business in Pennsylvania, all out-of-state corporations must first file a foreign registration statement, and a separate statute says that by filing such a statement, out-of-state corporations submit themselves to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. The Firm had previously argued on behalf of its clients that recent landmark Supreme Court decisions Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) rendered these statutes unconstitutional (at least in part), because those cases held that out-of-state corporations could only be haled into court in Pennsylvania on general personal jurisdiction grounds in the most “exceptional circumstances.”
While the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas initially did not credit this argument, it later ordered a hearing to address the issue, in light of even more recent Supreme Court rulings in BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), which solidified and clarified the holdings in Goodyear and Daimler.
At the hearing, Fishkin Lucks took the lead, arguing on behalf of nine corporate defendants that BNSF and Bristol-Myers made clear that Pennsylvania could not assert general personal jurisdiction over out-of-state corporate defendants–regardless of whether they had registered to do business in Pennsylvania–absent “exceptional circumstances” that plainly did not exist in this case. The Court agreed, dismissing not only all claims against the Firm’s clients but also all claims against all other out-of-state corporate defendants. This decision will fundamentally change the landscape of litigation in Pennsylvania, and more specifically, Philadelphia, as plaintiffs will be significantly inhibited from subjecting out-of-state corporations to the jurisdiction of the State’s courts.
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE –
Philadelphia, PA – Fishkin Lucks LLP has opened a new office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and added a senior lawyer to lead that office, David Lodge. According to Andy Fishkin, “our new office in Center City is consistent with the Firm’s plan for sensible, client-driven growth. The office is a natural extension of our growing practice in the Commonwealth and provides real value to clients who continue to look to the Firm as their go to counsel there.” Steven Lucks added, “as our level of activity before Pennsylvania courts has continued to grow, the question was no longer whether we should open an office there, but who was the right person to help lead that office. David Lodge is that right person. Andy and I, and others in our Firm, have had the great pleasure of working with Dave on a number of matters over the past several years, during which time we got to know him both professionally and personally. He is a wonderfully talented lawyer whose philosophies and values align perfectly with the philosophies and values on which our Firm was founded and that continue to guide us. Dave is an excellent addition who will help the Firm continue to deliver exceptional value not only in matters pending in Pennsylvania, but throughout the country.”
The Firm secured today a complete dismissal on behalf of its client, a national life insurance company, in the Supreme Court of New York (New York County) (Kornreich, J.). Plaintiff brought claims against the Firm’s client in connection with a life insurance policy that he purchased on the secondary market, claiming that (i) he was defrauded into believing the life insurance policy was governed by New York law, (ii) he was entitled to a declaratory judgment that the policy was valid and the death benefit would be paid out when the insured died, and (iii) the Firm’s client should be ordered to disclose precisely how it was calculating premiums on the policy. After a lengthy hearing on the motion, the Court dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, finding that plaintiff’s fraud claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for declaratory judgment that the policy was valid where there was no judiciable controversy with respect to that issue—the insured was still alive, no claim had been made, and, as the Court acknowledged was standard procedure in the insurance industry in these circumstances, the Firm’s client had not yet made a determination as to the validity of the policy. Finally, the Court held that plaintiff was not entitled to what amounted to mandatory injunctive relief regarding the calculation of premiums where plaintiff never even alleged that he was being overcharged.
Fishkin Lucks is pleased to announce that Andy Fishkin was named a 2017 Super Lawyer® in the area of Civil Litigation, and Steven Lucks was named a 2017 “Rising Star” in the areas of Civil Litigation by Super Lawyers®, the premier rating service for the legal community. Super Lawyers® bestows the “Super Lawyer” designation upon top lawyers in the country, and the “Rising Star” designation upon “the top up-and-coming attorneys” who are 40 years old or younger. The selection process is a multi-phased, rigorous combination of peer nominations and review by an attorney-led research team. Lawyers nominated Andy and Steve based on first-hand observations of them in the courtroom, including as opposing counsel and co-counsel. Less than 5 percent of lawyers receive the prestigious Super Lawyer designation, and less than 2.5 percent of lawyers under the age of 40 are selected as Rising Stars.
The Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County (Kornreich, J.), granted the Firm’s motion to dismiss today, dismissing as time-barred an action alleging that its client, the principal of an investment firm, had engaged in fraud, breached fiduciary duties and committed RICO violations in connection with investments made through his firm in 2006. Plaintiffs had brought similar claims against the Firm’s client in an earlier action in the state of Florida, which claims had also been dismissed. Plaintiffs argued that, pursuant to a provision of New York’s civil practice law, they had a six month window after the dismissal to re-file the action in New York, irrespective of the applicable statutes of limitations. At a hearing on the motion, the Court adopted the Firm’s position that the provision relied upon by plaintiffs did not apply when the previously-dismissed action had been brought outside the state of New York.
